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I·': 
FORMS AND EXPLANATION IN THE PHAEDO 
Charlotte Stough 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
December 1973 
In a well-known passage at Phaedo lOOc Socrates declares that "if anything else 
is beautiful besides Beauty itself , it is beautiful for no otheri reason than because 
it partakes of that Beauty". With that statement he advances the hypothesis of 
Forms in an effort to prove that the soul is immortal but also, apparently inci· 
dentally to that central theme , to expound his own view of "causation" (-rftv ahta'll 
�1f\c5et(etv).1 The section of the dialogue in which the Platonic Socrates is made 
to recount his early inquiries into nattn'al philosophy, and which provides the cont•xt· 
of the quotation, contains Plato's most explicit statement of the explana�o:ey role 
of the Forms • .  It. is just that function of Plato's Forms, as set forth at Phaedo 
95e-l06e, which. I propose to examine in this paper.. More specifically my question 
will be: What is.the force of the claim that the eidos is aitia? The method I 
follow in trying'to answer that question is dictated by the important consideration 
that the hypothesis of Forms is presented in that context as· a solution to cet>tain 
vexing problems. My inquiry therefore falls into two main sections in wh,ich I 
pose the following questions: What is the nature of the problems set forth.in 
relevant passages of the Pbaedo, and how does Plato's doctl'i.ne solve, or attempt 
to solve, them? A third and a final section deal with some implications of the_. 
thesis developed in the earlier parts �f the paper. · 
l.. The, Proble!Jl of Opposites 
" ·!' 
Socrates' ostensible raeason for.hypothesizing Forms at Phaedo lOOb-c is to 
answer an objection raised by Cebes (87a-88c), which seemed to cast doubt on the 
immortality of the soul. But Plato's aims �re seldom one-dimensional. It is· 
soon intimated (97b4-7), and finally assert�d (100b7-9), that the Forms are also 
intended to provide a solution to another' difficulty, a problem concerning t.he 
"causes of each thing, the reason why each thing comes into being, perishes, and 
is" (96a9-lO: e\6'tvat 't'�S a\d<xs h:&a't'ov, .Sta -rt ytyvnat lKaato'V Kat 6ta i't 
&ndAAUta\ Ka\ 61a Ti �CJTt). P�ilosopbically the more interesting, this aporia 
lies just beneath the surface of the dramatic discussion of the soul's fate after 
death. My initial task will be to try to determine the nature of Socrates' . 
puzzlement ovex- "causation" in an effort to isolate an important sense in lthich the 
Forms, in Plato's mind, might be said to provide an �xplanation of something. 
A useful bit of information is woven into' Socrates' account of his early 
experience in search of the causes of things. · His troubles began with attempts 
to explain, as.he tells us, the " coming to be", "perishing", and "being" of thin�s 
(95e9, 96a9-10, 91b5-6, 97c6-7). As a youth he was curious about the conditions 
under which living creatut'es are bred (ouvTpt•eo0at); he wondered whether memory and 
···opinion arise ( y1 yv£a0a t) out of the senses of hearing, sight , and smell, or 
something else; whetheI' knowledge comes into being (y�yveaeal) from memory and 
opinion. · And he was equally concerned about the destruction ('eop�) of these 
phenomena• But Socrates soon reached the conclusion that he was unsuited for 
these· studies, which so bewildered him as to cause dissatisfaction with all• 
explanations, even those he had thought reasonable prior to his inquiries. ·Indeed. 
he implies (96c3-7) that the study of natut'e actually compelled him to abandon 
his pre-philosophical v!ews. There follows .(96c6-97b3) an account of the exp­
lanations that Socrates was naively (and� as he no� thinks, mistakenly) p:;-one to 
accept prior to his philosophical investigations. I want to take up these puzzles 
very shortly. .· But. what ·is interesting about the b�ief. introduction to them 
(96a6-e6) is that it tells us that Socrates' philosophical puzzlement should not 
. be confused by us with the n_aive curiosity about natural causes that prompted 
·, his reseaztches ( 96a6-8). 2 Socrates' philosophical difficulties are actually 
generated by that inquiry, and they concern the coming to be, perishing, and being 
of things. We should therefore expect these notions to be especially relevant to an 
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understanding of the puzzles that follow in the text. The point of the intro­
ductory passage (96a6.-b6) might be put this way. Socrates' investigation of the 
"causes" of things has unearthed certain philosophical problems connected with 
generation, destruction, and being--problems that his own favorite common-sense 
explanations .. (96c3-7), as we,11 as the more learned theories of the physicists 
(96b3), had either not taken into account or been able.to solve. Is there any 
· · diagnosis ·of these puzzles; consistent with the text, which will make each of 
them intelligible as plHlosophical problems and. thereby help u.s to understand the 
source of Socrates' difficulties?:t I believe that such an account can be given, 
if we are careful to obs.erve Plato's own language as a reminder that, as ·he appar .. 
ently understands.these problems ,  they are supposed to throw serious doubt on the 
intelligibility of so!Tlething' s beipg, becoming, .or perishing. Plato 1 s own way of 
viewing them gives unit� to what otherwise must seem a very heterogeneous mixture of issues and problems. For convenience .I shall arrange the puzzles into three 
groupings, the firs t arid third specifically dealing with coming to be (and 
'perishing) and the second with being. ' ' ' ' 
· , · l. Socrates first mentions the problem of expla:ining .growth. (96c7-d6). , He 
used to. think. "f:hat the reason why a man grows ( o 1q -r"i. ti:vepw'ITos et"��ve:'t'ct \ ). is 
that he takes in food and drink thus adding to the bulk of his body. Flesh is added 
to flesh and bone. t0 bone, "and in this way the small.man becomes large" (r<:ai 
off-rw ytyv€aecn Tov crµir<:pov '&vepw'ITov µ"eyav} • . . But the explanation had to be discarded, 
·and (from the clause just quoted) we .inight expect this to have something to do with 
the fact that "becoming" ( y� yve:aecn ) is the thing to be explained, more specifically 
something's coming to be its "opposite". 5 . ·  
The concept of oppos ites (�vav1"1a), which.is central to this puzzle and the 
rest, promises a clue to their s oJ,ution. On the as sumption that opposites are 
designated by "incompatible" predicates,6 it is reason�le to suppose' that philo­
sophical difficulties that crop up over them will involve logical inconsistency . 
in assertions as igning properties to something. Granted that this is so,. the 
'possibility of a philosophical snarlseems less remote.· For if, i n  settingforth 
the problem, we consciously' fail to obs erve the dis tinction between a character and 
the subject it. characterizes,, contradictions will turn up. in Socrates' apparently 
inexplicable proposition that "the s mall man becomes large". 
Suppose that the subject expression ("the small man") refers not to one or 
another substantial individual of a certain s ort, characterized by being .. s)'llall, 
hut to a unita:ry s ubject compris ed in this case.of two "things" of equal status, 
namely, man and.small(nes ) blended into one, and so no less suitably designated 
by "the small" (6 crµir<:p d°s )  than by "the man" (� &vepw'!Tos). To clarify this 
supposition and its implications, let me try to bring into focus the pk.ture. that lies 
behind it. We can imagine a concrete individual as a complex blend of all those 
ingredients, each enjoying the same rank as a "thing",-designated by.its multiple 
substantial and adjectival predicates . 7 To do that it is necessary to erase. the 
familiar distinction between subs tance and attribute and to view both alike as 
possible "thing"-components of a complex object. If that distinction is obliterated, 
the differing functions of s ubs tance and quality terms, as we1i as the distinction 
between predicative and identity s tatements, will follow in its wake • .  Both.man and 
small(ness ), to return to Socrates' example, will be "thing"-components of.the same 
.. blended object itself fully "des cribed" by enumeration of the names of each member 
· of the complex. And if that is so, the name of any component, not just a substance 
term, can (in principle) function as a referring expression to de�ignate (however 
incompletely) the blended object. Finally, any descriptive statement that.links 
. a character predicate to a linguistic s ukiject conceived as designating such a 
complex will be a statement identifying.that character with a component of the 
blended object. Hence the u s u al predicative s tatement will be what I shal1 term 
a "partial" identity s tatement. Just as the propos ition that Simmias is (predicative­
ly). small is. entailed by the predication that Sirnmias is a small man�. so (according 
.to our present picture) the partial identity statementthat the complex object 
.. 
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referred to by "Sirnmias" is small will be entailed by the full identity that defines 
the being of Simmias by the conj unction of all his components. That Simmias is small 
will follow from the fact that small(ness) is one of Simmias• components-�will follow 
in virt ue of the being of Simmias, in virtue of what Simmias is. Now inasmuch 
as the components of the complex are jointly constitutive of that thing, anything 
incompatible with one of those components will be incompatible with the object 
itself. If we take "the small man" of Socrates' example to refer to such a 
blended object, that object cannot be said to be large without contradicting the 
proposition definitive of it's being. To make such an assertion would be to say 
that the blended object is partially identical with something incompatible with one 
of its components and: 'thus inGompatible with its own being. Similarly "the small 
.man becomes large" will' also be internally inconsistent by the implication that at 
some time a component of the complex object will be identical with its opposite. 
It says, in effect, that at some f'L'!.ture time (t) "the. small man i� large" is true. 
The troubles only intensify with fi;lrther elaboration of the picture. Both sub­
stantive and qualifying terms name components of the blended object and so enjoy 
equal authority in. their partial stat�ments of what · it is. Both can function 
referentially to pick out that complex object . The result, for the example in the 
text, is that "man" .C�v6pw1Tos) no more appropriately refers to the subject of dis­
course than "small" (oµl.KiJ6s). · A legitimate,.if more compressed, alternative 
formulation of the original proposition will therefore be "the small becomes large" 
( � aµ 'l Kpos y"l.yVe:'tet 1. µ'E:yets) ,  8 'the subject term referring as usual to the complex 
by naming one of its constituents. But in the case of "small" this dual role may 
cause serious trouble. As the name of a "thing"-component it isequivalent to 
"smallness" (crµlKP�Tns), while in its role as logical subject it functions no 
differently from, in this instance, "man". . Because the linguistic subject can refer 
to the complex only by' naming an .. ingredient of that object, the proposition seems 
to assert explicitly. that the component named by the subject· term becomes its 
opposite.· Our picture thus forces the formal contradiction that'"the F(F-ness) 
becomes not-F(F'.'"ness)", wh.ere F is a tjla,r.acter variable . 9 
. I have"intentionally p�esent�d this schem� as·a construction designed to explore 
the ramifications, in the context of the Phaedo, of treating attributes as if they 
were things. Nevertheless, it would.be possible for.someone to reach the same 
conclus ions quite without contrivance, that is, if for some reason or other he 
"simply failed to draw the distincti9n bE;itween substance and attribute.necessary 
to avoid the confusion. My thesis.willbe that such a person is 'the Platonic 
Socrates who, during his youthful inquiries into the causes of things, uncovered 
the philosophical problem of "becoming", which bis own end other more elaborate 
physical explanations were unabie to solve. No account of the consumption of 
food and drink by the body;, or any other hypothesis of the natural philosophers, 
will ever succeed in explaining why. ( iS i & Tl. ) what is small becomes large , if that 
claim is understood to be logically self-contradictory. What is needed--and this 
is the first fruit of Socrates' philosophical inquiry--is an explanation that 
will make possible (logically) the "coming to be11 of opposites , so that what is 
small may intelligibly be said to become large, thereby rendering comprehensible 
. the natural phenomenon of growth. 10 . ' . 
The confusion which I have maintained is crucial to this puzzle comes out 
cle�rly in the text at l03a4-c2, where Socrates explicitly draws a distinction 
b 
• . 
( ' ' , ,., d • .... .. , .. • • etween an opposite thing -ro e:vetv:r1ov 1Tpa.yµa at b3 an 1TEpl. 1wv EXOVTWV Tet e:vavna 
at b6) and the opposite character itself (afJ'to TO lvav-rtov at b4 and irE:pt �Ke:ivwv 
aOtwv Jv lx6vTwv �XEt Tnv frnwwµtav -rtt &voµca;;crµe:va at b8). The distinction 
clears·up precisely that muddle into which Socrates ' early:speculations had drawn 
him and.which in this subsequent passage is very cleverly put in the mouth of one of 
his interlocutors • .  ·rt is interesting that the passage at 103a4ff. explicitly refers 
back to 70d7ff., where the discussion concerned opposite things. There t,he dist inc ­
tion between character and thing chqracterized was quite correctly observed by 
s.ocrates ( being p�ior to his t:ale of philosophical perplexity) � but Socrates I 
: ,• 
.. 
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clarity in that passage was apparently not matched by his listeners, as Plato now 
indicates (at 103a4ff.), thus making with dramatic skill and subtlet-Y an impor­
tant philosophical point. By calling attention to the possibilities of confusion 
latent in the notion of the "coming to be of opposites", Plato brings out the 
source of Socrates' own youthful difficulties in explaining the phenomenon of 
growth. 
2. Socrates next takes up some puzzles (98d8-e3, lOia-b, 102c-d) having to do 
with comparitive differences of magnitude and quanti.ty. He used to be satisfied 
to explain s uch differences by reference to the degree to which one object exceeds 
(or falls short of) another. One man is greater than another by (reason of) a 
head.11 Ten is �ore than eight because of the additional two. An object two cubits 
long is greater than an object one cubit long, because of the excess amount of half 
its own length. But, as he remarks a little further on (lOla-b), an inconsistency 
(tvavT(OS ,A.6yos) arises here. The larger will be larger for the same reason that the 
smaller is smaller, and the larger will be larger because of something (a head) 
which iii small. This' we are told' is a "monstrous" consequence (Ka\ TOUTO on 
T�pas e:ivai ). · The same kind of difficulty iS involved .in claiming. that ten is more 
than eight by (reason of) two or the object two cubits long is greater than the 
cubit-long object by (reason of)half its own length. Considerations of this sort 
led Socrates to despair of finding a satisfactory explanation of these things. 
A pair of curious, and important, assumptions are at work in this passage. 
If we. generalize the examples,. Socrates seems to be objecting that opposite occur-
. rences or facts cannot be accounted for by the s·ame explanation and also, apparently, 
that the aitia cannot be (or be characterized by) the opposite of that which it 
purports to explain. The reason for these assumptions.is by no means obvious, but 
if we grant the conditions necessary to make them plausible, we shall·perh'aps be 
nearer to an understanding of what Socrates means by aitia. Notice that violation 
.of· one or.other of these principles is evidently enough to constitute a reductio 
ad.absurdu m of the sort of explanation he was previously disposed to accept. This 
suggests that ''by (reason of)" and "because of". are understood by Socrates to carry 
something like deductive force. If the relationship between the explanatory 
proposition and the explanandum is one of entailment, such that the second can 
be deduced from the firsti the inconsistencies mentioned in the examples under review are quite genuine. 2 I shall return to this point later, but I want to 
turn now to another less obvious instance of problems connected with relative 
magnitudes. 
· · 
· 
At 102b•d Socrates remarks that Simmias is larger than Socrates but smaller 
than Phaedo, C!-nd there is a question as to the correct explanation of this fact. 
It is suggested that a (mistaken) way one�might attempt to proceed would be to 
invoke the being of Simmias (-ro Eiµµfov dvm.) to account, .. for it. I include the 
fact to be explained in this passage in the second group of puzzles, because with 
the help of our model it is possible to recast it in the form of a familiar logical 
problem involving relative magnitudes. And once the problem is so understood, 
there is good reason for rejecting the hypothesis, as Socrates does, that Simmias 
has the properties in question because he is Simmias or because Phaedo is Phaedo • 
. , , Suppressing the distinction between Simmias and his attributes, we can think of 
Simmias as a blend of all the "thing"-components named by predicate expressions 
that are true·of him.· The prl':)position that Simmias is larger than Socrates but 
smalle'r than Phaedo can then be expressed as two partial identities, each following 
logically from the proposition defining what Simmias is. But si.nce the conjunct 
of those two propositions is internally inconsistent, the resulting-contradiction 
wi.11 be a restatement of the fact to be explained. The implication of this passage 
may .well be that it w.ould .be fruitless to try to explain such an impossible state 
of affairs .merely by reference to the· being of Simmias. And Socrates would again 
have reason to complain that, if·we accept the mistaken explanation, "the larger will 
be larger for the same reason tl1at the smaller is smaller".· The failure to distin­
guish between character and owner again ends in paradox, this time over the question 
, ' .. .. 
I 
• •, ,'< . 
,.'..:. 
•, )I 
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of the ''being" of Simr.nias, a predicament: similar tb the on$ involving growth, in 
which Socrates had previously· come up against the unint�lligibility of "becoming". 
The text permits.a closer look at the anatomy of this puzzle. At 102cl0 we 
' are told that because Simmias is larger ( µ d r;wv) than Socrates but smaller (t>.&nwv) 
_than Pha�do, he comes to he called both small (crµ1Kp6s) ani:I large: (µ£ycxs)� The 
.assumption is that the predicates_ "large11 and "larger than'' ('.'small" and "smaller 
than") are to receive the s:ame treatment in the exposi1;ion (and solution) of this 
· problem (lOOeS-6). Both deg?lees of.the adjective have the same reference, which 
irt,the case'of Simmias will be largeness (and smallness) (l02b3-6).13 There is 
clearly some slippage in the move from "Simmias is larger than Socrates·": or 
"Simmias is large in relation to Socrates" to "Sim!Ilias is .large", but co!lt!lary to 
what, :for that reason, may seem to be the most inviting hypothesis, the problem 
worrying Socrates (the incoherency of the secon� puzzle) does not spring from the 
unqualified ascription of relational predicates.to a single subject. Socrates tells 
us that if A is larger than B and smaller than C, A is indeed both large and srnallt 
but not in relation to the same thing. Relativ'e to the size of: B; A has largeness, 
while he has smallness compared to c.14 No contradiction results from that, so 
the correct diagnosis cannot be that these problems arise because A is (predicatively) 
both large and small. · · The source of the trouble is more likely to be that A is 
thought of as being (partially) identical with the opposites large(ness) and 
small(ness). On that hypothesis it would seem to follow that "the large (largeness) 
is the small (smallness)", a proposition which Socrat_es clearly understood to be 
self-contradictory. Indeed .he underscores this in the passage immediately · 
following (l02d6-8) by his insistence that "not only.will largeness itself never 
admit to being simultaneously large and small, but also_, the largeness in us. will 
neve� fCcept smal ness or admit to being exceeded". Again the crucial fallacy must 
be :-trac;ed to insensitivity to any relevant distinction between an attribute and 
that of which it is an attribute, such that to say of Simmias that he. is large is 
not to predicate a property (relational or otherwise) of Simmias, but to assimilate 
tq Sirru:rlias a thing-component apparently of the same logical type. i 5 ··'·(Notice fhat 
we.need not suppose Socrates to.mean in this in8tc3,nce that largeness will.not 
accept smallness, because largeness itself has the property of being large and 
therefore cannot also be characterized as small without contradiction.16 . Thpugh 
Plato may indeed have been preyto<such a confusion (and that is an independent 
question), it is important to see that the puzzles in this passage' are governed: 
by a fallacy logically more primitive than tnat of self-predication.) 
3. The third type of problem relates to arithmetical operations (96e5-97b4, 
10lb10-d3). Socrates professes inability to understand why or how one thing can 
become two by the addition of one, or how, when each is single, they can become two 
merely by being joined together. Nor can he grasp how two can come into being 
by the division of a single thing for the same sort of reason. His next complaint 
has a familiar ring. To claim that the ge'neration of two can be explained first 
by conjunction (bringing together) and then by disjunction (separating) is to offer 
"opposite" reasons for the same occurrence, and this is apparently no less absurd 
than adducing a single explanation for opposite occurrences. On the supposition 
that this last objection can be rendered intelligible in much the same manner as 
its twin in the preceding puzzle, let us concentrate on the more central issue of 
arithmetical operations. 
· · 
That this part of the puzzle is not framed explicitly in the language of 
opposites does little to disguise it. The question is how a unity can become .a 
plural:ity, and "one" and "two" are treated accordingly as incompatible predicates. 
If it is claimed that one (thing) becomes two, there is no way to avoid paradox; 
mathematical talk of addition and division will scarcely explain how the F (a 
unity) can become not-F (a plurality). Again the slide between (formal) attl:'ibute 
and subject, between a unitary entity and unity itself, is essential for this 
puzzle to have any bite. Notice that it makes no difference whether the problem is 
stated in terms of the juxtaposition of physical objects or in more abstract 
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. ·mathematical language. The question is the same in either case: How does two 
come into being from one? The "things" involved may be understood either as 
material.objects or abstract numerical entities and the arithmetical operation 
either-physical or conceptual.17 Socrates' question is addressed to the mathemati­
cians, whose arithmetical propositions imply par>adoxicallythat one becomes many 
and, what is even more absurd, that the explanation of this anomaly is an operation 
(physical or conceptual) such as addition or> division. It is essential to see 
that regardless of.how.the ope:bation is construed, the logical problem remains and, 
further> that Socrates takes that problem to be one of coming to be and. perishing. 
-Tne account-of philosophical problems left unsolved by his predecessors concludes 
with Socrates' unequivcicai deni�l that he can understand by their methods how one 
comes into being, anq in general "why anything else comes to be, ceases to be, or 
is" (97b5-7). 18 · 
· 
I think it is evident that the tangles which lie at the heart of all these 
··.puzzles ·are conceptual in nature and so are not essentially tied to either physical 
or: mathematical speculation: as such. But;,Pis is obscured by the diverse areas of 
inquiry in which the difficulties crop up and further masked by the language of 
"being"and "coming to be". It is also clear that Socrates' intent is not to deny 
such obvious facts as that when animals ingest food they grow, that one man is a 
head taller than another, or that when we add one to one the result is two. His 
·Chief concern is not with �hese facts as such, but with their possibility, that is, 
with the intelligibility of statements alleging to explain them. When Socrates 
asks for the ''causes of each thing, the reason why· each thing comes into being, 
perishes, and is", he is asking a question that is not, indeed cann ot be, met 
by statements such as, "a man grows by the intake of food", "one becomes two by 
addition (or division)", 11this man is taller than th at by a head". The puzzles 
in:question a re intended to challenge the possibility of something's being or 
becoming of a certain "oppositen character. The force of Socrates.' question is not 
-to ask why or how something is (becomes) F but to ask how it is possible for that 
thing to be (become) F, where being F seems to necessitate being not-Fas well.19 
My suggestion has been thqt the logical snarls embedded in these puzzles can be 
defined by a failure to distinguish adequately between character and thing charac• 
terized. If so, the problem of understanding how a thing can be or become 
something "opposite" is surely, at its roots, a problem of coming to understand 
what it is to predicate a character of an individual. Propositions· attributing 
characteristics to things have not yet been sorted out as a special group different 
in function from those that identify the thing mentioned in the predicate with that 
designated by the subject term. It will be no small part of the merit of Plato's 
attempt to solve these problems that it seeks to carve out just such a distinction. 
· 2. The Hypothe�is of Forms 
Socrates puts, forth: the doctrine of Forms straightw�y as a solution .. to his 
philosophical difficultie9. He will revert, he says, to·the well-known notion of 
·his that 11there exists a Beautiful itself, just by itself· (aOTo Ka0' cnh• ) , and also 
a. Good, a Large, and all the rest'' (lOObS-6) and, on that hypothesis, ile will 
maintain that the reason why an object is beautiful, for example, is because it 
partakes of that Beauty . 2 0  As for all the "learned" explanations of these things, 
.he cannot understand them and will therefore cling "simply, artlessly, and perhaps 
even foolishly11 to his own "safeli explanation that the only thing that makes an 
object beautiful is the "presence" ( mxpouofo.) or "communionn (Ko\ vwv\a), or 
whatever that relationship turns out to be, of Beauty itself (lOOd-e). 
It is clear that Socrates intends this novel explanation uniformly to provide 
a solution to the three sets of puzzles outlined, all alike problems of being, 
becoming, and perishing. He runs through the examples again briefly. It is by 
(because of) Largeness that things are large, by Smallness that they are small and 
for no other reason. Similarly ten is more than eight in virtue of Plurality and 
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not because of two. The same kind of account must be given if we are to understand 
why something becomes large or small , more or less numerous , and the lik�.(l0lc2-4). 
Two col'J)es into being by participating in Duality and one by participating in Unity, 
addition and division playing no role in the relevant explanations. Socrates presents 
his hypothesis of Forms to account for these facts and thus to establish the 
legitimacy of characterizing individuals by the use of opposite names (l02al0-b2). 
I have argued that the question "Why (in virtue of what) is x p1121 must be 
understood to ask "How is it' possible for x to be F", where being F suggests the 
unfortunate predicament of being not-F as well. If we treat Socrates' hypothesis 
as·an answer to this last question , then the form\,lla "xis Fin virtue of(because 
of) Form 0° will read "0 makes it possible for x to be an F11.22 Arid for.that to 
be an adequate solution to h'is troubles concerning "causation'·', it will have to 
· : have the effect of ¢iefusing the pontradictions seemingly embedded in th.e very 
· 
concepts of "being" , "becoming"� and "perishing". On the asswnption that this 
diagnos is is correct as far as it goes, the introduction of another class of 
entities over and above individuals such as Socrat.es and Simmias, sticks and stones, an� other . similar phenomena, together with the claim that an individual is of a 
certain character in virtue of being related to one of those· entities, regardless 
of how tha.t relation is construed (lOOdS-6), would suggest very strongly that Plato 
. is recommending a different ' and presumably improved' way of understanding . 
predicative assertions of the form "xis F", where "x" stands for an individual 
and "F" a character. 23 . If 1'x partakes of (a" expands the meaning of the original 
assertion, Plato has indeed cor�e up with a means of resolving the contr>adictions 
generated by the . conj unction of opposites. · . •. 
The text at l02b3-d2 bears out thc:lt inference . Socrates observes (b8-l0) 
.that "the fact of Simmias exceeding Socrates is not in tr\lth as the words2i. 
express it". And he goes on to say that "Simmias surpasse� Socrates not by nat\We, 
not by reason of the fact that he is Simmias (T� Eiµµt'av dvcn), b.ut because of the 
largeness that he happens to have T-rq1 )Je:yE:ee:i. '6 Tuyxave:i. �xwv). Nor does. he 
surpass Socr•ates because Socrates is So crates , but because Socrates possesses 
smallness in relation to the larg�ness of Simmias". 
·1 take the poirit of those remarks to be that assertions such as "Simmias is 
larger than Socrates" are misleading, insofar as they imply a wrong account of the 
facts. The implication seems to be that what we.are trying to.explain is actually 
misdescribed by "Simmias is large(r) • • •  " ,  which, as a consequence of that misdescrip· 
tion, wrongly suggests that the reason why Simmias surpasses Socrates is because 
he is Simmias··-because of the being of Simmias himself--whereas in truth the reason 
is supplied by a quite different entity, Largeness , to which he stands in a particular ·relation. I have argued that the picture of a concrete individual as a complex 
blend of n.thing"-components na,med by its substantial and adjectival pre<Hcates 
forms a backdrop for the prob l ems Socrates is grappling with in this passage. 
In�, ke�ping with that model , "�immias' is large(r) • • •  II is a partial identity· statement 
entailed by the complete "description" that identifies Simmias with a conjunction 
of ''thing"-components. Because the form of the proposition "Simmias is large(r) • •• " 
can be viewed as r>epresentative· of that ontological structure, we are now in 
a position.to appreciate the import of Socrates' remarks. "Sitnmias islarge(r) ••• " 
misdescribes the fact in question by misrepresenting its structure • .  As a ,result 
it suggests misleadingly, in accordance with the picture embodying that misrepresen­
tation , that the fact of Simmias surpassing Socrates <To Tov E1µiifov 6ne:pfxe:w 
&KpaToos� is to be explained by the being of .Simmias {Tl.ii Eiµµfo\> dvcu), by the 
. self-evident tautology. that Simmias is identical with himself. But of course the 
same analysis applies to "Simmias is smaller than Phaedo" .  So· if the confus:ions 
that generate this mistake are not cleared up, we are ·left with the logica:). 
embarrassment that contradictory consequences will follow from a single identity 
statement: opposite s will be produced by a single "cause". It is hardly surprising, 
then, that Socrates should have balked at the earlier "explanation" that one man 
is lat>ger and another smaller "by a bead" (lOla), as well as the notion that there 
can be opposite "causes " for the generation of two. The first presupposes 
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contradictory implications in a single explanation, while the second commits us 
to identical consequences deduced from contradictory explanations. 
L 
The new formula "x partakes of (2111 provides a solution to these puzzles, because 
it goes right to the heart of the trouble. By separating the subject of discourse 
from its attributes and affirming a relation between them, it discloses the actual 
structure of the sort of fact misrepresented by locutions of the form "x is F". 
If Simmias is distinct from largeness and .also from smallness, we are not forced to 
conclude that "the being of Simmias" is an explanation with contradictory impli­
cations or that largeness and smallness are one and the same.25 The separation 
of Simmias from his attributes makes it possible for Simmias to "be" both large 
and small.26 
· 
Notice that Socrates. apologizes for the pedantic tone of his new way of talking 
(cn;yypacp1Kws kpe:t\r) but insists on its. necessity if we are to understand how we can 
speak intelligibly of Simmias as both "large" and "small" (102cl0-ll). Indeed, the 
peculiar awkwardness of the language is an indication that Socrates' original 
proplems in trying to explain the being, becoming, and perishing of things arose 
out of a failure to distinguish between individual and character in such a way as 
to allow him knowingly to predicate (knowingly not to identify) the one of the other. 
The new language of Forms and "participation" has the effect of altering the picture 
cal,led up by the subst;ance-attribute confusion. A character, now distinct from 
·a concrete individual but at the same time related to it, ·can no longer be thought 
of as a component, of a blended object. It is something possessed by an individual, 
indeed, shared in by many individuals. We thus have a unitary object described by 
its relation to other things rather than one "described" by enumerating its 
components. Socrates' "bookish" way of talking is meant to display the ontological 
structure of a fact involving two discrete but related entities rather than a single 
composite of miscellaneous character..:ingredients. 
Immediately following (beginning at 102d5) Socrates carefully differentiates 
between asserting opposites (characters) of each other and asserting opposites 
of individuals. Statements of the former type only are outlawed. They are banned 
because they are logically viCious, both those in which the Forms themselves are 
said to be their opposites and those in which a character is affirmed of its opposite 
"in us" (102d6-el). But to say, f".'lr instance, that the. small man is, or becomes, 
large is not the same as saying that the small (smallness) is, or becomes, large 
l02e2-5), because the ontological structure that actually underlies the first of 
these statements preserves .it from the genuinely contradictory implications of the 
second.27 Plato's new formula assures that Socrates can be both small and large by 
·illuminating the structure of the fact described, namely, the individual Socrates 
standing in a certain relation to entities distinct from himself, hence, "receiving" 
(oe:�aµe:vos) opposite characters.28 
· 
3. "Opposites in Us" 
. At 102d6-7 Plato has Socrates draw an explicit distinction betweien "Largeness 
itself" (a.ut"o t"o µE:ye:eos) and the "largeness in us" ( -r'o tv flµtv µtyaeos), · a point 
that has often been noted in the literature on the Phaedo.29 Yet the contextual 
significance of the distinction between the Form and its concrete instantiation 
has, I think, been overlooked. My contention will be that far from adding a third 
eleme.nt to an ontology already burgeoning with new entities, Plato is there simply 
calling attention to the two versions of contradiction we now have to guard against 
.and to. distinguish from statements that legitimately affirm opposites of something. 
The novel hypothesis of Forms brings with it, as he must indeed point out, the 
conceptual impossibility of affirming either member of a pair of opposite.Forms 
of the other . But, granted that the Form Largeness will not admit its opposite, he 
is also careful to remind us th at to affirm the largeness "in us" of its.opposite 
is logically no less pernicious. This is a pointed reference back to the philo­
sophical aporiai, in which logical difficulties seemed to be generated by "the 
. ·'···· 
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small man becomes large" and "Simmias is larger than Socrates but smaller than 
Phaedo"--statements which, on reflection, made it look very much as if the small­
ness "in us" becomes, and is, large and vice versa. The implication_ is that we 
cannot construe those statements in a philosophically naive manner with.out 
unwittingly affirming opposi.te characters "in us" of each other. To fall victim 
to that confusion is tantamount to offering an explanation of the fact in question 
which, however· seductive, is no less vicious logically than the undisguised 
contradiction that openly identifies the Form Largeness with its opposite Smallness. 
The contrast in question thus has a legitimate purpose in its context other than 
the ontological separation of Form and immanent character.30 Indeed the relevant 
ontological distinction has already been made. And once that has been done, it is 
permissable to contrast the Form as such, just by itself (€v TTl <j>uoe:t, Cl.UT� K0.6' 
a.OTo)with the Form as it is shared in by (related to) some individual, in its 
manifestation as a characteristic of (say) Simmias U:v fiµ'i'v). Given the discovery 
of a crucial· difference between character and thing characterized--a logical.coup 
effected by an ontological postulate_:.-the "largeness in us" is no more than an 
alternative way of referring to the phenomenon of someone's being large (To TOV 
l:1µµfov 01Te:p£xe:i.v l:w<:pa:rous), tlie very fact that originally stood in need of explana:.. 
tion. 31 The phrase. £v �µ1'. v should not be pressed further. At 103b8, '.following 
one occurrence_of the contrast between opposites "in nature" _(tv TTl <j>ijo:e:'l) and 
"in us" av fiµ'lv), the opposites themselves are said to be "in" th�se other things 
that come to be called after them, and that is a clear reference to (opposite) 
Forms.32 To force a precise and consistent mea1iing on these terms is· to forget 
that Plato's. language is not technical. He has already acknowledged a certain 
loosenes9 in his description of the relation between Forms and particulars at 
100d5-6, where indeed the "presence" (1rp:pouola.) of the Form is actually cited as 
an acceptable candidate to depict that relation. 
Though the notion of a duplicate set of properties is quite irrelevant to the 
message Plat.a. wants to convey, he does have to insist on the necessity of separ­
ating a character from whatever may be characterized by it, because to do that is in 
effect to separate opposites from each other. As they appear "in us" those opposites 
are mixe.d (blended) together and confused. Each visible particular is "multi-
. form" ('ITQAUe: i Us), appearing perhaps both beautiful and ugly, large and small, 
equal and unequal ( 80b4). Plato's point is that if·, in accordance with our percep­
tion of them, we continue to take the opposites as "one" neglecting to sort them 
out as "different" Ot°Te:pa) from the:"1:i subjects (hence from each other), we shall 
be unable to untangle the difficulties to which he has made Soc.rates fall victim. 33 
But the ontological distinction be tween a character and its owner is the hypothesis 
of Forms. Consequently, the statement that Simmias possesses largeness is 
equivalent logically (and ontologically) to the apparently more ambitious claim 
that Simmias partakes of the Form Largeness. Both locutions,along with "the large­
ness in Simmias", do,the. same -impo:rta11t work of_divorcing attribute from subject, 
of drawing out the realimplications of "Sirnmias is large(r) ••• 11•34 This is 
made clear at 10_2bl-c8, where Socrates mentions as the reason (explication) why 
an individual (e.g., Simmias) is (sa:i.dtQ be) of a certain character (e.g.,· 
large), not only tha.t the individual "shares" (µe:rnXaµSaw::iv) in a Form but also that 
largeness is �'.in�! (lv) Simmias and that'he ''possesses" (1txe:1v) that character. 
All three expressions are .in fact signs .Qf a first major stepc toward sorting out 
the ·troublesome notion ofpredication from.an undifferentiated concept of being. 
Much the same sort of interpretation can be given of Plato's use ofthe terms 
"withdraw" (O'ITe:Kxwpe:"i v) and "peY'ish" (&'IT6XAua6a.t) of the opposites "in us". His 
aim in introducing these two metaphors at 102d9-e2 (followed by others carrying 
similar meanings) is to set the stage for the proof of immortality by presenting what 
appear to be alternative ways of picturing the concept of logical incompatibility. 
That the terms are not intended to be applied either exclusively or literally to 
immanent opposites taken as entities in their own right is revealed by the use 
' 
-�· j ...... .......... ____________________________ .� 
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Plato makes of them beginning at 103d5 and again at 106a3. When he puts the two 
terms to work, it is the subj ect to which one member of a pair of opposites necessarily 
belongs that is said to "withdraw" or "perish" at the approach of the incompatible 
character (104b7-cl). Snow, fire, and sou�·, all of them subjects (among others 
mentioned) necessarily characterized by.opposites , must either ''with draw" or 
"p'erish" in the face of heat, cold, and death respectively. While snow and fire 
(understood as substances) may conceivab.ly perish at the approach of the incom-
patible character, soul, a subject essentially characterized by life--an opposite 
excluding deatp C&eava:rov) and entailing .the imperishable (&vwA.£8povF-can only 
withdraw in the.face of death. It is suriely clear� at least by the end of.the 
immortality argument, that Plato wants us to understand soul as an individual 
naturally defined by life and thus forced to withdraw (quite liteI'ally) at the approach 
··.bf death� But prior to the beginning of that argument (from 102d5 .to 105c7) the 
talk is confined neither to individuals nor to opposite characters "in us". 
In particular, it is not specified whether the subject that "brings along" 
(bn¢tp€1) ari opposite is a concrete thing or a certain sort of thing. The subjects 
in question are referred to quite indeterminately as"snow", "fire", "three", and 
"two11•35 I believe that the resultant ambiguity is crucial to Plato's objectives • 
. _ .. . ·- ... On th� .one hand, he wants to hold open the possibility of treating these subjects 
as individuals in combination with a literal (and visual ) understanding of 
·11withdraw11 and "perish" for the purpose of the immortality argument, where the soul 
must be viewed as �n· indivi dual that survives death. I mean that he needs the concrete 
picture vividly depicted by these terms precisely because that final argument 
has an important existential point. But prior to that final argument he wants 
to emphasize the logical i" �ompatibili ty between characters "in us.n, a point which 
need ndt have ontol-ogical overtones peculiar just to it. So, if there is nothing 
in Plato's language that commits him to an ontology in whi,cli. form copies must be 
included along with Forms and :l.nd,ividuals, it would be a diSservice to burden him 
with it. Let us see whether or not this is the case. 
' 
·Throughout the passage in question Socrates is talking about individuals, 
Forins,' and the mc.nifestations of these Forms "in us 11• Under no circums·tances, 
neither just by itself nor in any of its.multiple manifestations, will a Form admit 
its opposite. To stress that, as he does for example at 102d5-103a2, is merely 
todeny logical compatibility between opposite characters. He sums up at 
ld3c7-8: nwe have agreed then on this general point that an opposite will never 
be opposite to itself". But when Socrates goes on to speak of the opposite "in us" 
and something else that 11brings along" that opposite, as "withdrawing" or "per­
ishing" at the approach of the incompatible character, he seems to be .saying sometBing 
more. If, as I have suggested, there is intentioncil ambiguity in the text from 
102d5 to l05c7, the reference to certain otheI' things such as fire and snow, 
bearing with them opposite characters "in us", could be to the concrete individual 
substances or, with equal plausibility, to the sorts of things identifiable as fire 
and snow. Following the thread of Socrates' argument up to 103c7-8, let us take 
him to mean the 1.atter. The additional claim then concerns an incompatibility 
'.' �elation holding between opposites and certain other characters that are not them­
selves opposites. The metaphors "withdraw" and "perish" serve only to underline 
that incompati Uity. That is, if we take snow and fire to be kinds of things 
rather than substantial entities, the statement that snow must "withdraw" or 
"pe:riis.h " at the app::.'oach of heat can be understood to claim no more than tlfat 
either snow and heat are incompatible (snow "withdraws") or snow is not snow 
(snow "perishesi'). We are being told that because snow and cold are logically 
inseparable (�XE:l TTJV EKdvou µop¢nv ad), to deny the incompatibility between 
snow and h.eat is contradictory. Socrates' exact words are (103d5-8), '1snow,, 
being· what. it is, will never admit the ho": , as we were saying just now, and still 
be what it w�s , snow and ci.lso hot·, but on the approach of the hot it will . · 
withdraw .or perish". In brief, at this stage of the argument Plato does not.need 
a. literal interpr<:;tation of, "withdraw" and "perish11 to make his point, which is a 
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logical one. If snow and fire are understood to be kinds of things rather than 
physical substances, the two metaphors stripped of their imagery merely extend 
an incompatibility claim already made at l03c7-8 to a !few set of characters. 
Nevertheless, the referential ambiguity of " snow " , "fire", and the rest remains 
· for a very go od reason. Once the diScussion r.eturns to the quest ion of immor-
. tali ty, Socrates' argument must ]),e able to exploit that ambiguity. The force of 
his argument rests on the possibility of giving these same sub j ect terms a concrete 
reference, so that soul, an individual existent, will be understood to withdraw 
quite literally, hence to survive , at the apporach of the opposite death . 36 
4. Conclusion 
The interpretation I have defended rests on the claim that an elementary but 
critically important logiml distinction provides the key to understanding the 
problems that beset Socrates in the Phaedo. If that distinction seems too s implis­
tic to have been missed by Plato's predecessors and contemporaries, it is enough 
to recall the numerous passages in the dialogues in which Plato has Socrates pose 
the question "what is (the) F?" and receive in reply a "swarm11 of F-things.37 In 
each case Socrates carefully explains the difference between asking for that in 
virtue of which something is F and asking for a list of (types of) things or 
actions which are F. In fact that very confusion, which Plato wove into Socrates' 
statement of the puzzles in the Phaedo, was in his own eyes pervasive and difficult 
to penetrate . Originating in the unclarified and "mixed" nature of sensory ex­
perience, it was reinforced by a linguistic structure sanctioning (predicative) 
assertions of the form "x is F" and their contradictories and finally threatened 
to become part of the arsenal of philosophy itself in compliance with the neces­
sities of a Parmenidean-type logic. In that context it is not difficult to see why 
the hypothesis of separately existing characters (Forms) would be invoked to 
explain (to render consistent) those puzzling factual discrepancies . However 
easily overlooked by an unreflective intelligence, such problems could scarcely be 
dismissed by someone who had fully appreciated the power and implications of a 
rigorous dialectic that purported to establish the c onceptual impossibility of 
something ' s being, becoming, or ceasing- to be of certain oppos i 1e characters . 
If my argument is correct, we may have good reason to believe that Plato was 
s eriou sly occupied with logico-ontological problems of the sort first posed by the 
Eleatics before he wrote the Parmenides and other "critical" dialog ues of his mature 
period.38 But the exact nature of the puzzles in the Phaedo is rendered partiQularly 
obscure to us by the language at Plato's disposal for dealing with philosophical 
questions. The language of atT1a, ysvEcris, and �eopa, and a context in which the 
hypothesis of Forms is presented apparently in competition with the physical theories 
of the natural philosophers suggests quite misleadingly that the "facts" 
explained by the doctrine of Forms are on a par with phys ical phenomena others had 
sought to understand in terms of such causes as heat, cold, air, fire, and even 
mind. But Socrates' rejection of the physicists' causes gives us a hint that this 
may not be the case-- a hint that is borne out by the spe cific examples chosen to 
illustrate the problem of 11causation11•39 On the other hand, the language and 
context also tell us that Plato's own conception of explanation is tied to a physical 
model of causation . By this I mean that to explain how it is possible for (say) 
Simmias to be both large and small, he must posit entities to which Simmi as is 
related and which, in being so related , explain the possibility of this fact, just 
as the physicists accounted for natural phenomena by the intera ction of physical 
substances. Plato's new entities are of course not physical objects, and we have 
seen that they do not do the same work as physical causes, but the context of the 
Phaedo blurs that distincti on . It shows that for Plato those differences were not 
so sharply etched. In coming to grips with what are essentially logical and 
conceptual problems Plato doubtless had in mind and followed the examp le set by 
the natural philosophers . It seems very likely, therefore , that he thought of his 
. r· 
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Forms as causes of certain puzzling facts in a manner initially not wholly unlike 
that in which others had believed air or fire to be causes of various physical 
phenomena.40 Plato's language suggests that his own explanatory formula, though 
strikingly different in function from any other, was fashioned after those of his 
precursors • 
r 
i . _: . ;  ; 
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NOTES 
1. In a valuable article ("Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo", Phil. Rev., 
LXXVIII (1969), pp. 291-325) Professor Gregory Vlastos has reminded us that 
at Tl et is much broader in mearting than the word 11cause11, which is frequently 
used to translate it. He goes on to argue that by failing to distinguish 
between "cause11 and "reason11 in our translation of the Greek term we are apt 
to misunderstand Plato's solution to the puzzles at Phaedo 96 c-9 7b, which 
. invokes the Forms as reasons (logical ckf-1'<f-L1j in delfberate and purpo�eful 
contras t to ·the causes (physical a.'i ... :r.fo·v)\ naively endorsed. by So crates in his 
youth. Though it seems ·to me doubtful whether the distinction in English 
between· "reason'"' and "causen; 'important a.s it is· in many philosophical con­
texts, will bear the burden in interpreting the text. that Vlastos wants it 
to bear, I do not wish to appear to �eg any substantive questions by the mere 
�oice of terms to translate a\'t'{o: . .  In'many cases I s hall rende.r it·:QY. the 
ne:utral ''explanationn, but sometimes, when the context seems to call for it 
and nothing in my- argument hinges on the translation, by 1 i cause 11, "causation", 
or "reason". I trust no philosophically sensitive reader wi.11 be misled by 
this·. What .is ·clear is that the 'hypothesis of Forms is intend ed to· be :ex-· 
,. �planatory; .what has to •.be made c:lear is the sort of explapation it �l:'OV�des. 
2. Compare Meno's puzzlement at Meno 80a-b and that o:f the slaV.e 
.boy at .. 84a-d. 
R .. ,Hackforth writes in a similar vein 'that Socrates' i1study forced· upon . him 
the. recognition of deeper problems coricernirig c ausation,· �hi ch he had. never 
suspected to be problems11, but Hackforth takes a different· view of the' nature 
of these problems ·fr9!Il J:he one I offer in this paper. Cf. R. Hackforth, 
Plato's Phaedo (Library of Liberal Arts, 1955), p. 131; W.D'. Ross, Plato's 
Theory of Ideas: { Oxf·ord, 1951), p. 26. 
3.. I say 11consistent with the- text" because the best that can be done here is to 
try to reconstruct the· sort of philosophical difficulty that gives rise to 
these puzzles from the scatte!!'.'ed hints. and suggestive remarks embed.ded in 
Socra.tes 1 account of them and their soluti6n. No interpretation can· c:faim 
absolute confirmation from- the text' but over and above consistency we. can 
; · : look for an account that :benders the largest part of the. Platonic context 
philosophically comprehensible and to that eXteht plausible or even compelling. 
4. Offhand it is difficult to see what the physiology of.growth (96c7) has to 
do with the matter of relational predicates (96d8), not to speak of arithmeti­
cal operations. ·such as addition and division' ('96e5). Thus Vlastos (op. cit., 
p. 309, n. 50), overlooking Plato's ·l'ingtiistiC. (9oriceptual) framework, is 
misled into excluding Socrates' remarks about growth (96c7-d6) from the puz­
zles to be solved; on the ground that they "involve no absurdity'1• He fails 
:.!':.to SE)e that Socrates I common sense b.¢1iefs about growth' which philosophy 
fo'.rced :him to abandon (11unlea:m11),
' 
are; irifecte'd with the sarrie sort of (logical) 
difficulties as .beset the rest of· the puzz1e·s. '·· ; ; ") 
5. In this passage Plato does not explicitly refer to 11large0 and "smail11 as 
opposites U:vmnta), but .he does• so .a.t 102d..:e. 
6. The characterization is, of necessity, loose. Roughly, it refers to those 
predicates which cannot, as a matter of logic, be true of a subject at the 
same time and in the same respect. Some pairs of opposite predicates (e.g., 
11large11 and "small", "hot" and 11cold11, "beautiful" and "ugly") are contraries, 
but the most important feature of these, as of "equal" and "unequal", nodd" 
... .-. 
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and "even", and other contradictories (judging from Plato's treatment of 
them), is their apparent incompatibility; and this is best brought out in 
se lf-contradictory assertions. It is worth noting that Plato's examples 
are most often comparative or relational predicates. To bring out the intended . 
con tradiction in assertions involving opposites I shall use the variables F 
and not-F as shorthand for any pair of incompatible (opposite) predicates. 
7. It has o�en been remarked that the Presocratic philosophers had no conception 
of qualities as such. In the absence of the substance-attribute distinction 
what we would designate a quality was thought of concretely either simply as 
a member of the class of objects possessing that character or as something 
resident in the objec t and responsible for its character. See especially 
R.S. B luck, Plato's Phaedo (London, 1955), pp. 175-6; also F.M. Cornford, 
Principi um Sapientiae (Cambridge, 1952), p. 162; W. K. C. Guthrie , A History of 
Greek Philosophy� Vpl. l'(Cambridge, 1962), p. 79; H.F. Cherniss, Aristotle's 
Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Ne�1 York, reprinted 1971), pp. 361-2. 
· On�. of the objectives of this paper is to explore some of the philosophical 
imp li cations of that impo rtant obs ervation . 
' ""·· 
8. ·Acceptable in Greek but not in English. Note that the confusion does not 
spring, from linguistic ambiguity. The meanirig of the Greek sentence is clear. 
The trouble 'arises from a conflation of subject and -attribu.t·e�.. 
. 
9. . A ch aracter · is typically designated by one member of a pair of '!opposite" 
(in compatib le) predicates' such as 11large"' "small"' "hot"' "cold"-, and the 
like. But ·we shall see that the character variable must be ext ended ·to in-
. elude numerical predicate s (10lc5-7, 104d5-6) ,,:which, if not themselves op­
posites, "bring opposites along with them". · What about substance -terms, such 
as 11water11, "fire'', "man", .and the like, which are also accompanied by oppo­
sites? There is no explicit treatmen t of s ubstant ial entities in the Phaedo, 
and if we are to take seriously the comment at Parmenides 130cl-5, Plato was 
at one time puzzled about their status.· Never theless , the tone of the passage 
at Phaedo 103c-105d (especially 104e7-105al) suggests that in that dialogue· 
substantial entities such as fire are to be treated in a fashion parallel to 
· that ,given the number three, which Socrates calls a Form (tota} • .. If so, they 
·too will fall within· the range of the character variable . (Plato's use of 
l0£a, J .. 10pcjr(], and r::Toos: in the ?haedo does not seem to me precise or systematic 
enough to warrant drawing technical distinctions among their meanings. The 
words lo�a and µop�� are apparently used interchangeably at 104d9-10, and 
the language at 10lc2-7 suggests that 1o£a is there used interchangeably with 
r:: T oos. The po ssible differences in nuance need not carry any ontological 
import.).· 
10. The historical origins 6f this problem should therefore not be located simply 
in: Anaxagdras' questions about nutrition, _not at least without the reminder 
that Anaxagoras-' theories arose in response to the philosophy of P armenides. 
(DK 28 B8: · ·  11For what origin will you seek for it? How and whence did it 
grow ? Not 'frorhwhat is not' will I allow you to say or think".) Cf. 
Hackforth , op. cit., p. 131; Bluck, op. cit., p. 107, n. 2; J. Burnet, Plato's 
Phaedo (Oxford, 1911), p. 102. ·I do not mean that the Eleatics were the 
source of any of :the actual' arguments in the Phaedo. My chief interest in 
this paper is with the philosophical, as disting:uished from the historical , 
genesis of the Theory of Forms. Accordingly, all references to Socrates are 
to the dramatic and hot' the hiStorical personage. 
11. 
'.; .'. 
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The dative case, as has often been remarked, is .ambiguous in this context. 
It signifies. the degree of differen_ce. betwe en the heights of A and B, but it 
·also is intended to have. explanatory force, as. is. shown, by -t:he .ne�t two 
examp_\es ,' which are .illustrative of tpe same 'problem and empioy the 'causal 
.o 'la <With the accusative. But' i:t is not at all· ql�ar (contra l:!ackforth, 
<,op • .  cit.� p. 131) that the philosophical puzzles connected w�th .A 1s b�ing 
taller than .B are generated by a confusion between two usages of the ·.�reek 
dative case. The sense in which uby a head" could possibly be though� ·to 
be explanatory is no doUbt obscure, but we need not convict·:�Sdcrates of 
idiocy in this matter. Perhaps he means no more than that reference to the 
'' amount by which one object exceeds 2nr)ther generally puts an 'end to questions 
about relative magnitudes, and that he himself used to think th�t" statements 
incorporating such references constituted a sufficient account'''of the matter. 
(If B is six fe�t taJ,l . and A. is ,six feet two inches, it is the e�tra two 
inches that make A tailer tli.an B; the extra two inches are whaf ]'ustify A's 
claim to be taller) . . . At ,the, ,ti\l!e., Socrnt�s. saw no reason to. q�estion further: 
�µ�_v yap . t KcNws µot ooKe:�i\i' (96d8). · '· 
12. Allo wing also that opposites b,�- 11riepess�ry11 chara�t�;isti. 'c� of whateveii they 
accompany. 
1 3. ,Not, �� ·suggested by l.!1. Crombie as. a possibility, the property of being­
taller-::than-Socrates (An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, II (New York, 1963) 
P• 312). -Throughout th� d2scussion at l02d'.'.'"l0;3 the .attributes themselves are referred to wit hout qualification. 
14 .. ' Phaedo 102.c4.: crµ1Kp6-rma. ¥xe:1 · .. 6. �wKpthns 1Tpos _-rb tr<dvou µeye:eos. 102c7: . 
µ€ye:6o:? �xe:i p <I>a.'lowv .1fpcs -rnv· l:t µµl'ou crµi�po�nn:t� See also Symposiu.Jn2lla � 
wher.e the qualifications specifying the time, .relation, and respect in which 
opposites are predicated of a sub::;ect are nade ye:ry explicit. Republic 436b8 
and 436e8 contain clear enough statements of the law of contradiction. 
is:.·::'."But1th�.: "is0 in_11simmias is tall" is not consCiously (or strictly) that of··· ·· . 
, identity. ff" as I am claimiJ1g, the distinction' be-t;,ween sUbject. and .attri-
bute. had not yet bee:::i shc:.rply · C'.J::'<<:N"n, u. scrr.ant ic counterpart in two uses·. of 
the verb 11to be11, viz., identity a-:id predication, cannot have be en seen any 
,m<;>pe clearly. The two. uses of e:'.fvm arc merged in a :;;ingle undifferentiated 
concept of "being", a:�1d -i:his' (to put the prob'lem linguistically and there-· 
. fpre,. I think., 2 . .  shad3 r::is le a.dingly} is the source of the fallacy. 
16. Cf.,, for.example, Archer-Hind.18 comment on l02a-;t.03a (The l?haedo of Plato, 
·secondEdition (London and New York, 1894)� pp._104-105). 
17�:. Cf;. Vl�stos (op'. cit., pp. 311-312,; ,followedby Evan Burge, uThe Ideas as 
. AitJai in the P'ha.2"<l01 , Ph1�onesis,' 19 71, �p. 8) for the view. that the puzzle 
�rises only if arithmetic2l op::.:rations are treJ.ted as physical operations. 
But at 10lbl0-c2: Socrates rej�cts withcut any such qualification the o:pera­
tions of addition 2nd division as reasons. See also 10lc7-8: Tas '0€ erxtcre:ts 
TO'.UTO'.S KCtl :rrpocrefoe:1s KO'.l TCTS qAAO'.S TO·tCl.UTO'.S KOµi)!da.s E:wns &v xa.tpe:w. . . ' t . ;.: ·, 
18. Ther,e follows the long section. (97c-99d) in which 'Socrates .describes'hi_s hopes 
an<'.l his sl1bs-equent d�sappointment in Anaxagora� 1: ,theory o:f votls as the. cause 
.of all things. I cimi t consideration of the pas.�ip_ge because" of Socrates I 
·confe_�sion of. failuri=. pith�r to discp'.v:..dr (e:0pe:'lv) by h,i}riself that the a.\T ta 
KO'.t &.vayKnof all thirigs is TO &.ya.eov' �'cit ofov or to'iearn '(µa.ee::lv) it from 
' ]'.;. 
··.; � · .. 
. . . . . 
··1 
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others· and his disclosure (99c6-d2) of a "second voyage" (oeurnpos 1TAOO's), 
viz., an alternative method of inquiring into the causes of things (trri Tttv 
Tns a\T\as �nTncrtv). This is surely a reference back to Simmias' remarks at 
85c-d, where, in defaul t of discovering (e0pe\v) something for ourselves or 
learning (µaee\v) it from another, we are advised (in the absence of divine 
assistance) to adopt the best and most reliable &vep6m,ivos >.oyos and use it 
as a raft to sail through life·(cf. Pamela Huby\ Ph'ronesis, IV (1959), pp. 12-
14). The >.oyos which Socrates'·is leading up to (at 99d::<LQOc) and which he 
finally puts forth (at lOOc) iS the hypothesis that the .doos is ahfo of 
·being, becoming, and perishing. The passage implies that. Socrates would have 
found a teleological explanation acceptable, but teleology as such is not the 
object, of his search. Anaxagoras' theory does not explain how things are 
disposed for the best, but that need imply little more than that it does not 
meet ·the criteria of intelligibility imposed by vous. 
19. The inseparability of opposites is brought out clearly at Rep., 479a-b. 
20. Literally ''that· Beautiful" (l,00c6). Even though the Terms effectively separate 
individualS, fro_m charaCters,:: Plato is not �ntirely ciear about··the nature of 
.the substance-attribute d,�stinction, and.the Forms:theinselv!fs.alternately 
· function as chc;trad:ers· and things characteriz.ed. Leaving to one side the 
.. que$tion of self-predication, we bften find terms such as dAtKpw£s, 
;, ·&cruv8eTbv, Ka8apov, &e&vaTov, ee\ov predicated of Forms. Cf, Phaedo 66a, 
· •··· 78c-d, 79c, BOb. It seems wisest therefore to render aho To KaAov alter­
nately as 11Beauty itself11 and "the Beautiful itself", depending on which of 
these aspects is· being stressed, the Form's being a subject-thing or its 
being a character. 
·.: . 
21. Henceforth I shall express the 11why�question11 (and Plato's answer to it) in 
this form only, omitting the formulation in terms of 11becoming11• But it 
should be kept in mind that Plato's solution is also intended to E?Xplain why 
::Hri virtue of what) something becomes F. 
22. I follow the convention (adopted by Vlastos) of using Greek letters to desig� 
· nate Forms. chiefly to preserve the ambivalence of the Form as both individual 
. and property. The character lfi will thus be an abbreviation for "the Form 
corresponding to F11, which can meah either "F-ness11 or "the F itself". 
· -, 23 • .  F.M. Cornford (Plato and Panmenides (London, 1939), pp. 76-80) give's what 
seems to me a correct analysis of statements of the form "x is F't., but he 
cannot see ho w (1) "This rose partakes of Beauty11 is explanatory of ·(2) "This 
· rose is beautiful". Hence he complains (p. 77) that "we have only an analysis 
. 0£ a statement or of a fact' not a reason for the statement being true or a 
cause of the fact's existence 11• But Cornford did not grasp the nature of . 
Plato's problem clearly enough to see that the Form secures the possibility 
of the fact, hence, the intelligibility of statements thought to be descrip­
tive of it. He therefore did not see that (2) can be true only because it is 
expanded by ( 1). The causal (explanatory) power of the Forms is conveyed by' 
the instrumental dative, 61a with the accusative, and the verb 1TOte1v� _ 
24. The clause ihs Tol's pnBetcrt >.£y£Tm (102b9) refers back to 102b4 ((hav .Et'�µfov 
.EwKpaTous <Prys µd r;w d vat, <I>a.{owvos <5€ t>..anw) and not to 102bH Crb Tov 
.E1µµ{av D'ITEpE:xe1v .EwKpclTous), which in some translations (e.g. Hackforth, 
Bluck) is put in quotations. Hence the words referred to as not properly .. 
expressing the fact of Simmias 1 surpassing Socrates ( ro r'ov .Et µµ!a.v D1Tep"�X£}\I . 
.E-wKpaTous) are 11Simmias is taller than Socrates" (.Et µµi: a'I.!· .EwKparows j.te {r;w £wad: . . ,-'' � : 
,- � . ' 
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The argument concludes with {102cl0): "In this way, the;t>efore, Simmias is 
said to be both short and tall". 
25. Cf. Republic 523a-525a where the identical problein,wh�ch arise_s in that con­
text over the length of a finger , is said t9' provoke �hilosophical reflection. 
Sight presents the large confused or mixed (auyKE:xuµ�vov) with the · small, · 
reporting that a finger is both large and smali arid consequeptly that the 
large and small are· one. It is the work of· intelligence (vonai.s). to. cleari up 
thi s confusion by viewing as separate and mmixed (ii::e:)<wp \ aµ{v ov ) what the 
senses perceive as one. Intelligen9e thus- affirrris 'the exi stence of two dis­
tinct �-things {the large and the small ) rather than pne. Here the intelligible 
('t'O vorrr6v)-, Le�' tbe Fo!'ms- , niust be distinguished from the visible- (To ·'' 
opa't'6v), Le., sensory- particulars'� to· resol-V'e by clarifica tion . foacj)'rl:ve::i.a) 
familiar logical difficulties nia�ing the puvity of sensory phenomena·. -This 
is none other than the doctrine of the Phaedo • . . T6 . c?ome to an ·Utiderstanding 
of what seems to be a paradoxical sensory· phenomenon by_ posftirlg inte lligible" 
·entities distinct ·from that phenomenon is the saiiie as being abie _t<!> :produce 
an expJ.anation of it by the same device. The .Pfo�lem in the R¢ptiblic passage, 
as in the Phaedb; is to separate things (the iarge and the. small) left unsepara­
te.�d(0o Ke:xwpi.aµeva) by the senses. Hence it dmnot be resolved by pointing to· 
the diffe.rent times, relations, and respects in which opposing cha�acteri_z?t-
·
·. tions are true of a subject. There· is no evidence that Plato ever to�k 
seriously the sophistries based on failure to indicate .. the varying . tiajes, . 
re lations, and respects in which a subject might �e said �o "suffer, be, ·oz. 
do opposites" (Rep. , 4 37al-2 ; see also 4 36b -437a.; Euthydetnus 29 3c.,.d) ; . and 
this makes it all- .the more doubtful that the serious discussion at 523a-525a . 
.. 
· 
·· 
- .should turn on that sort of fallacy. (Cf. G.E.L. oW�n, "A Proof in . . :fhe 'J?eri 
h...,., .Id.eon'", reprinted. in Studies in Pla to ' s MetaphysicS., -ed. R.E. Allert·,_ -�(London9 
New York, 1965) p.· 306; G. Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in Plato11, Ne# E:ssay� 
on Plato and Aristotle, ed . R. Bambrou gh {London., 1965), p. 15). Adatn :dght!y 
relates Rep. 523-52� to Phaedo 100-103 and perceives that the main point of 
the Repub lic passage is to draw attention to the way in which we come to dis-
. .;. ··�: .. 
. tinguish between Forms and the ir impure alloys in the phy sical world, which 
is to say, the way in which we come to discover that there are Forms. (The 
Republic of Plato II, (Camb ri dge, 1902), notes on 52 3ff.). The Republic-­
passage should also be read with Phaedo 74b4-c5, with which it has close 
. , 
affinities; and Theaetetµs 154-15 7' which sets forth "Pro tagoras I II so.iutiori 
..... to .the same type _of pr?ble'Jll. 
·· 
\ : , := ; ·� :·:· c 
26. Crombie {op. cit., 'pp. ·-291-292) aptiy':re·iri�rks that Plato's u se 'of"�a<ve:aeai. 
:i,n . . c,onte�ts in which opposites are attrib,uted to sensory particulars may �e 
,. _ in�.;_cc;i.ti_ve �f 'hl.s - � luct at:} Ce .to ass�rt. t�at: an iJ:l:di vidual is both F and not-F. 
· ·The· term r.iay also :P9 int to 'th� sensory, of\i:gin of the· 'coiifus ions --co nne·eted 
with opposit es • r·_ · ·,. · · :_ 
" 
" ·· ... · ' 
· 
' · · : ', ·. _ . 
. . : . . -_ ·. 
The same point is made in P arme nides �"'where the crucial 'distinction between 
characte r and owner is stressed at 129c2-4 and again at d2-5: "If someone 
tries to show that the same thing is both many and one--that is, stones and 
sticks and the like--w e shall say he has demonstrated that something is both 
many and one, not that the one is many nor the many one". In that dialogue 
too the hypothesi s of Forms is put forth in an effort to dislodge the contra­
diction arising from failure to distinguish (separate) an {opposite) attribute 
from the subject possessing that attribute. 
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28. The same analysis applies to the "clever er" explanation (105c2), even thoug h 
it has a quite diffe;p,ent function in the argument. The motivation f6ti pro­
ducing it and the use to which it is put :a:re quite narrowly restricted to 
the proof of immort ality; so t he 11 clevi::rer11 explanation brings us back to the 
main theme of the dialogue. Nevertheless, if r/J makes it possible for x to be 
· F, any Form that entails (11brings along") 0 also makes it poss ible for x to 
be F. This is the substance of 105b5-c7. (I think it is likely that 7Trrp, 
7TUpe:Tos, and µovds in that pass age are intended to apply both to Forms· and 
concrete··particulars. Throughout the section beginning at 103cl0 up to the ' ····· 
pas.sage .in. question it is not always apparent from the text whether ·Plato iS .. 
. tal�ing �about Forms or concrete particulars, but the ambiguity is necessary' 
·for· the immortality argument.) 
· 
2·9 � For· disC,ussion 'O·f. this dis tinct ion ·see Cornford (op. cit .  , pp..- 7Bff.); 
. .. 
Hackforth--(op. cit.,.pp. 143, .153-157); Ross (op: cit., pp. 30-31); B.luck··. ··· ·······.- ···· 
..
. .. . . 
-- ··· · . .(o"Q4 .. cit._,. pp;·17-18); ·R.G • .  Turnbull, 11Aristotle'·s Debt to the Natural. 
· 
PhiJ.osophy of the Phaedo", Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1958), pp • .  13lff •.. ;. . . · 
�- · .,.JJ,,Keyt, nThe Fallacies in fhaedo 102A-107B" � Phronesis, 8·{1963),. .. pp� 167ff.:.;_ . 
""'"�--- .. .. ., ... �--··· . ,Vlasto� ......... . '.'Reasons and Causes rr, pp. 298ff'; D..  D 'Brien, "The .Last-A-t>gument-�.of.. . 
. ,P,1ato,r·s Phaedo11; Classical Quarterly N.S. 17 (196-7); pp., 201-203; W.J ..• 
-..,.. .. .. Ver�nius, "Notes· on Plato 1s Phaedon, Mnemosyne ,l,l (J.,958) PP• 232-233. 
-,··:- . .... 
30. I·· me� immanent <:!haracter· as .distinguished from the individual as such. My" 
······ ·· -.� .. ,�ent i_s -Oirected only agalnst the notion-of a tripartite ontology , and,. 
.
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"'.'' .. it, intends no implications as to the nature ( ana1ysis) of individuals' .about 
which ·the' Phae.do seeins to me: to shed very little ··light. It is noteworthy . 
that .. ;th&;passag·e:.in Parmenides in whi.ch�,a tripartite ontology does see m tq. . . 
. 
be implied (13Sc9-d5) has Parmeni.des _(not Socrate5) .as the speaker-, putting'· 
· ·  
.,..,...·· · . 
fortr;L:.f:h..c.r.itici.sm of the· theory of Forms. I find no similar ontological ;i.rapll-. · 
·cat:iori. .in Parme.nides t words at 130b3-4. In that context "Likeness itself" ·add ". · 
,, 11the likeneS'S we possess n simply p.ar,aphrase the distinctipn drawn -·in_ the sen- =­
. • :ten.ce .immediately preceding between . .  the Forms.themselves·(e:Yon ati-rct) and.the .. , 
�-
···.:· 
· ·  : . · · · ·' things· that share"in. them CLcr Tou-rwv µetf.:xovTa). The stress in the passage 
..... -� ''' . ·  
,. ___ ,.,,.. ·is on the separation of Forms from particulars; accordingly Parm.enides is 
�: ·.� 
inquiring about Socrates' commitment to the doctrine of eepa.:t:!a:te-ly. existing 
Forms. 
.. : . . . . 
31..  !-for does Plato need the no·tion of an immanent form for the immortality argu• 
-S2. 
ment at 105b5-107. It is clear, at least by 10 6b2 , c9 (if not at 105e6 or 
before ) , that the soul is not a chare.cter (immanent or transcendent) but 
ol something which is itself characterized as immortal .. 
i \.ttrv •o:e -��p '\. ,-cK:e:l,\>�\) aOTWV �\; tvoVnuv �X€U.) Tnv· t1TW\)\.J'µ:(av T� 6voµca;o'µ€\)'Ct'. '..At 
l05c, regardless of the status of Tiup, :rrupe:Tos, µovas, it .is evident that 
ee:pµoTns, vocros, and 7TE:PlTT6Tns are Fo1-rms and are thought of very loosely as 
being uin11 things., even though at that point ·socrates' · interest in the "safe" 
·a.hi-a has given way in the .. .face of a "cleverer" ahfa; Cf. also 104b9-10. 
One of the prineipal interpretations of participation· ( µe:TaA.aµS&ve:i v) crit i­
cized in the Parrnenides (131"-132) is t hat Forms are liter ally 11in.'1 particulars 
fof. · 133c-134). 
. -. ···�� 
•. ''-4 
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33. At 74a9-c5 equality is said to be something different (�Te:pov) from equal 
sticks, stones, and the like--something:"over and above all these things 
( 1T<Xp a rn.\ha 1TaV Ta). We are made aware of this difference by the fact that 
equal sticks and stones sometimes appear unequal, whereas equality never 
appears to be inequality nor the equals themselves unequal. At Republic 
524a3-4 we are told that the same thing is perceived as both hard and soft, 
that ( a9-10) according to sensory reports the heaVy is light and the light 
hcaVy, that (c3-4) the great and the small are not separated (o0 Ke:xwptcrµt:vov) 
. ''in our perception but mixed (auyKE:.)(UµeVoV)�,and that (c6-8) intelligence 
.. must clarify this confusion by ,f.egal9ding them as separate rather than mixed; 
that is, (blO-cl) it must consider' the opposites, separated, as two instead 
of considering them, unseparated, as one ( e: i '&.pa t\ haTE:pov, aµ<j>oi:e:pa oe:' 
ouo, Tel yri:. ouo KE:XuiPtcr]..isva vorfo:e:H ot> yap av UXWP'tO'Ta YE ouo �vd'e:t' &!.).', fv). 
The'·separation of oppositEis is'·accomplished by;.distinguishing between the 
intelligible Form>(to vonTov) and�the visible object (ro 6paTov ) in which it 
is ma..1ifested (cl3). • The status of Forms as separated ar)d unmixed is under­
lined by epithets such as EfAtKptvt.s, Ka8apov, �µt: tKTOV, J.lovoe:uS{s °(Phd. · 
66a, 6 7b, 1Bd, 79d, 8Gb; .. Sym:.:: 2llb, 2lle. 
34. Burge writes (op. cit. ,cpp. 6"-7) that the relation between (l) 0x' pa;t>ticipates 
in 95" and (2) !ix is F11 "must be a non-symmetrical relationship in' view of the 
ontological commitment of (l)", and (p. 10) that to affirm (2) nis to make a 
state:nent f:riee from metaphysical presupposi tions11• But Plato's point is quite 
to the contrary. His aim in postulating Forms is precisely to uncover the 
ontological cc:nmitments that really are being made when we utter statements 
of the form "x is F1;. 
--
35. The language at l03e 3-5 2nd 104b7-10 suggests that the reference is to particu­
lars. But at 104d5-7 it is said that whatever things are occupied by the 
Forn of three are compelled to be three and also odd, an indication that 
three, a-nd vc.:ry likely fire, fever and unity (105c), are intended to be under­
stood also 2s Forms. See the parallel treatment of three, two and fire at 
104e8-105nl. The numerical references at 104a-c (n Tp t as , n 1T€µ�i:as, Ta ouo; 
Ta LETTapa, Ta Tp(a) only add to the ambiguity of the passage, which must be 
intentioaal O!l Plato's part. The entire discussion from 102d5 to l05c7 may 
be i1ead as e.pplying to both Forms and individuals. 
36. My argument in this section ha3 been a negative one. It has not been my 
pu:r.1pose to offer a detailed interpretation of the text from 103d to the end 
of the immortality urgument, That complicated passage raises more questions 
tho.n I could hope to deal uith in this paper. Instead I have focused on a 
single problem whicJ.1 bears directly on my thesis with the aim of showing 
that nothi:'.lg in Plato's language there commits him to a tripartite ontology. 
Given these limitations of objective, the thesis set forth in this paper will 
be compatibb ·with more than one interpretation of that passage. 
37. For ex2.niple, t'.eno 7 le-72d, Euthyphro 5d-6e, Hippias Major 287d-e, Laches 190e-
192a, Theaete�l46d-e; see also Republic 33lc-d, Euthydemus 300e-30la. 
38. Ross (op. cit., p. 83) refers to Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, and 
:Poii-t'icus as a "group of dialogues which display an interest in Eleaticism 
that has hitherto been absent11• Bluck (op. cit. , p. 184) writes that ii the 
Phaedo ..• is concerned with the F011ms as metaphysical 1 causes' and as objects 
of mo:"al aspiration that are 'real', and hardly touches upon logic at all". 
20 
Burnet finds no Eleatic influence in the Ph aedo, but sees the later dialogues 
as Plato's attempt to emancipate himself from the Megarian influence (Greek 
Philosophy, (London, 1960) pp. 231-235). 
39. My conclusion in its most general form thus accord s with Paul Shorey's conten­
tion that in the Phaedo Plato "is really describing a possible procedure of 
logic and not a false a priori method of the investigation of nature" (11The 
Origin of the Syllogism11, Classical Philoaogy��XIX (1924), p. 8). 
40.. Burge (op. cit., pp. 3-4) notices that the candidates for q.\.r{cn in the Phaedo 
are frequently. entities rather than propositions, .but he attributes this to 
an aspect of the ';syntactical behavior" of the Greek term a\-r{a . 
.'\ ·. 
